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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis argues that the United States is failing to fulfill its obligations under 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in its adjudication of the hardship 
standard in non-LPR cancellation of removal. It is well-documented that the current 
interpretation of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard results in the 
separation of families and de facto deportation of children, many of whom are U.S. 
citizens. This thesis contends that this practice is not only unjust, but also unlawful.  
 
First, it argues that the CRC in general and Article 3 (the “best interests” 
principle) in particular have risen to the status of customary international law. Second, 
drawing on legal principles of statutory interpretation, it finds that the hardship provision 
of the statute governing cancellation of removal for non-LPRs, INA § 240A(b)(D), is 
ambiguous and should therefore be interpreted in a way that accords with the CRC and 
the “best interests” principle. Third, it illustrates that the current adjudication of the 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is substantially different to a 
“best interests” assessment and is therefore not in compliance with the CRC. 
 
It concludes that, because the CRC is customary international law, and ambiguous 
statutes must be interpreted in a way that complies with international law, the hardship 
standard must be re-interpreted so that it incorporates a “best interests” assessment in all 
cases involving children. Finally, it offers guidelines for short- and long-term changes 
which could bring the hardship standard in line with the Convention and the “best 
interests” principle.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship”  
 
In 2001, two United States citizen children, aged 8 and 12 years old, were “de 
facto” deported to Mexico.1 Their father, a 34-year old citizen of Mexico who had lived 
in the United States for twenty years, had been found removable and ineligible for a form 
of relief known as cancellation of removal.2 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
determined that the hardship his children would suffer on return to Mexico was not 
sufficient to prevent his removal: it was not “exceptional and extremely unusual.”3 In 
accompanying their father to Mexico, the children would leave their school, friends and 
family behind – to arrive in a country they knew very little of, with fewer education 
opportunities and poorer economic prospects. But that was not enough.  
  In 2002, a 30-year-old Mexican single mother of two U.S. citizen children, who 
had lived and worked in the United States for seventeen years, was also found ineligible 
for cancellation of removal.4 The Immigration Judge (IJ) had initially found that the 
children, aged 6 and 12, would face “complete upheaval in their lives and hardship that 
could conceivably ruin their lives.”5 The BIA, in reversing the IJ’s decision, determined 
that the children, who had lived in the United States for their entire lives, would “likely 
be able to make the necessary adjustments” to their future lives in Mexico.6  
 
                                                        
1 In re Francisco Javier Monreal-Aguinaga (B.I.A. 2001); Amanda Colvin, “Birthright Citizenship in the United 
States: Realities of De Facto Deportation and International Comparisons Toward Proposing a Solution,” Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 53 (2008): 219–46. 
2 Matter of Monreal. 
3 Matter of Monreal. 
4 In re Martha Andazola-Rivas (B.I.A. 2002). 
5 In re Martha Andazola-Rivas (BIA 2002). 
6 Matter of Andazola. 
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These two decisions, Matter of Monreal and Matter of Andazola, form the 
guidelines for determination of the hardship level necessary for non-LPR cancellation of 
removal.7 Under the current statute, INA § 240A(b), an applicant for cancellation of 
removal who is not a lawful permanent resident (non-LPR) must provide evidence that 
they fulfill four requirements: (A) a ten-year period of continuous physical presence, (B) 
good moral character during that period, (C) no convictions of certain specified criminal 
offenses, and (D) evidence that removal would result in “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship” to a citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) spouse, parent or 
child.8 In both Monreal and Andazola, the applicant had fulfilled the first three 
requirements, but failed the final hardship determination. The BIA has published just 
three decisions that determine how judges should interpret this barrier to relief.  
The third published decision, Matter of Recinas, illustrates just how high the BIA 
has interpreted the hardship standard to be. In the 2002 decision, the Board granted relief 
to the respondent, a 39-year old citizen of Mexico, who was a single mother of four U.S. 
citizen children (aged 5, 8, 11, 12) and two noncitizen children (aged 15 and 16). Her 
four youngest children were entirely dependent upon her, had never been to Mexico and 
did not speak Spanish. As the daughter of two LPRs and sister of five U.S. citizens, she 
had no relatives in Mexico who might be able to assist with return, and her family would 
                                                        
7 Matter of Monreal; Matter of Andazola. 
8 Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, INA § 240(A)(b) (1996). 
(b) CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN NONPERMANENT 
RESIDENTS.- 
(1) IN GENERAL.-The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien- 
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years 
immediately preceding the date of such application; 
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; 
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3), subject to 
paragraph (5) 2a/ 5/; and  
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, 
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 
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face significant upheaval. In its decision, the Board emphasized that this case was on the 
“outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases in which the exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship standard will be met.”9 Other cases, with “smaller families and relatives 
who reside in both the United States and country of origin” would be unlikely to meet the 
standard. 
Most families are not like the family in Matter of Recinas. Because of the high 
hardship standard, thousands of children face de facto deportation or separation from 
their parents.10 In 2016, approximately 18 million children under the age of 18 lived with 
at least one immigrant parent – accounting for 26% of the population of children in the 
United States.11 Of these children, 15.9 million (88%) were born in the United States.12 
Between 2011 and 2013, half a million U.S. citizen children experienced the 
apprehension, detention and deportation of at least one parent.13 In just the first six 
months of 2011, the government removed over 46,000 mothers and fathers of U.S. citizen 
children.14 The problem of parental deportation has existed for years, but became worse 
after the introduction of the current hardship standard under the 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). With the Trump Administration’s 
ongoing expansion of immigration enforcement, these laws are affecting more and more 
children.15 
                                                        
9 In re Ariadna Angelica Gonzalez Recinas (B.I.A. 2002). 
10 Lucy Twimasi, “Hardship Reconstructed: Developing Comprehensive Legal Interpretation and Policy Congruence in 
INA Sec. 240A(b)’s Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship Standard,” Chicano-Latino Law Review 34, no. 35 
(2016); Colvin, “Birthright Citizenship in the United States.” 
11 Jie Zong Hallock Jeanne Batalova Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova, and Jeffrey, “Frequently Requested Statistics on 
Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, February 2, 2018.  
12 Hallock. 
13 American Immigration Council, “U.S. Citizen Children Impacted by Immigration Enforcement” (Washington DC: 
American Immigration Council, May 2018). 
14 Applied Research Center (now Race Forward), “Shattered Families: The Perilous Intersection of Immigration 
Enforcement and the Child Welfare System” (Applied Research Center, November 2011). 
15 Randy Capps, Muzaffar Chishti, and Michelle Mittelstadt, “Revving Up The Deportation Machinery: Enforcement 
and Pushback under Trump” (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018). 
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There is clear evidence that parental deportation has incredibly traumatic effects 
on children.16 This is true whether the child remains in the U.S. or accompanies their 
parent(s) – a statistic that the government does not track.17 The group of children who are 
most likely to face parental deportation are already at much higher risk for poor health 
outcomes, in part due to the constant fear of apprehension by immigration authorities.18 
When children are exposed to adverse events such as parental deportation, their 
neurobiology is significantly altered, precisely at the age when brain development is 
critical in determining future health.19 Parental deportation causes toxic stress 
accumulation, which can lead to long-lasting, irreversible health impacts on children.20 
This stress affects a child’s mental health, increasing risk of depression, anxiety, 
isolation, self-stigma, withdrawal, and behavioral problems. It can also alter a child’s 
biology, causing changes at the DNA level which increase the risk of inflammatory 
diseases such as cancer.21 The broader economic consequences of deportation also impact 
health outcomes: deportation causes significant loss in median household income, which 
results in decreased educational opportunities and healthcare options.22 
Under current immigration laws, these consequences are not considered severe 
enough to warrant relief from deportation. Because the hardship must be more extreme 
                                                        
16 Ajay Chaudry et al., “Facing Our Future: Children in the Aftermath of Immigration Enforcement” (The Urban 
Institute, February 2010); Lisseth Rojas-Flores et al., “Trauma and Psychological Distress in Latino Citizen Children 
Following Parental Detention and Deportation,” Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy 9, no. 
3 (May 2017): 352–61; Fernando Stein, “AAP Statement on Protecting Immigrant Children,” January 25, 2017; 
American Immigration Council, “U.S. Citizen Children Impacted by Immigration Enforcement.” 
17 American Immigration Council, “U.S. Citizen Children Impacted by Immigration Enforcement.” 
18 American Immigration Council; Randy Capps et al., “Implications of Immigration Enforcement Activities for the 
Well- Being of Children in Immigrant Families” (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, Urban Institute, 
September 2015); Eleanor Chung, “Expert Affidavit of Dr. Eleanor Chung Regarding Toxic Health Outcomes in 
Children Who Experience Parental Detention and Deportation” (City and County of San Francisco: Zuckerberg San 
Francisco General Hospital and Trauma Center, July 4, 2018). 
19 Chung, “Affidavit Regarding Toxic Health Outcomes.” 
20 Chung; American Academy of Pediatrics, “Toxic Stress on Children: Evidence of Consequences,” n.d.; Samantha 
Artiga and Petry Ubri, “Living in an Immigrant Family in America: How Fear and Toxic Stress Are Affecting Daily 
Life, Well-Being, & Health,” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, December 13, 2017. 
21 Chung, “Affidavit Regarding Toxic Health Outcomes.” 
22 Chung. 
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and unusual than the “typical” hardship faced on deportation, factors that affect all 
children who experience parental deportation are insufficient. The rights of children are 
given no particular consideration in the adjudication of non-LPR cancellation of removal 
claims, despite their increased vulnerability; hardship to children is considered in the 
same way as hardship to qualifying spouses or parents.23 This stands in stark contrast 
with international legal norms, in particular Article 3 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the duty to consider the “best interests” of the child in 
every decision that affects children.24  
II.   Literature Review 
 
Non-LPR cancellation of removal is not the only element of immigration law 
which fails to consider the interests and rights of children. U.S. immigration law lags 
behind family law and international standards, with limited and outdated conceptions of 
children’s rights deeply embedded into its basic framework.25 With the exception of 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), a form of relief for unaccompanied minors, 
immigration law does not include any kind of “best interests” consideration.26 Because of 
these failures, David Thronson advocates for a variety of reforms across immigration law 
which would alter its treatment of children and incorporate mainstream legal and social 
values regarding children.27 
                                                        
23 Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(A)(b). Under Section (D), an adjudicator considers hardship to “the alien's 
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 
24 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), Article 3(1).  
25 David B Thronson, “Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration 
Law,” Ohio State Law Journal 63 (2002). 
26 David B Thronson, “Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship,” Nevada Law Journal 6 
(2006 2005): 51. 
27 David B. Thronson, “Thinking Small: The Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s Treatment of Children,” UC 
Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy 14 (2010): 239; David B. Thronson, “Entering the Mainstream: Making 
Children Matter in Immigration Law,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 38 (2011 2010): 393. 
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Drawing on Thronson, scholars argue that the introduction of a “best interests” 
standard into immigration law is both “common sense”28 and the moral responsibility of 
the United States.29 Joyce Koo Dalrymple contends that the best interests of the child 
principle, following the model of SIJS, should be used in the asylum process in order to 
prevent the deportation of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.30 Bridgette Carr 
argues that the United States should follow the Canadian model in order to implement a 
best interests approach in all aspects of immigration law and procedure that affect 
accompanied children.31 
Other scholars focus on the Convention on the Rights of the Child itself as a tool 
for reform. Timothy Fadgen and Dana Prescott argue that U.S. ratification of the CRC 
would lead to the modernization of immigration law in line with international standards.32 
Erica Stief argues that the U.S. is violating its duties to comply with the principle of 
family preservation, a principle that she argues has risen to the status of customary 
international law.33 Erin Corcoran recommends the formation of a statutory federal “best 
interests of the child” standard that is informed by the CRC and unconditionally applied 
to all children seeking immigration relief.34  
                                                        
28 Jennifer Nagda and Maria Woltjen, “Best Interests of the Child Standard: Bringing Common Sense to Immigration 
Decisions,” Big Ideas 2015 - Pioneering Change: Innovative Ideas for Children and Families (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 2015). 
29 Becky Wolozin, “Doing What’s Best: Determining Best Interests for Children Impacted by Immigration 
Proceedings,” Drake Law Review 64 (2016): 48; Ann Laquer Estin, “Child Migrants and Child Welfare: Toward a Best 
Interests Approach,” Washington University Global Studies Law Review 17, no. 589 (July 25, 2018). 
30 Joyce Koo Dalrymple, “Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of the Child Principle to Protect 
Unaccompanied Minors,” Boston College Third World Law Journal 26 (2006): 131. 
31 Bridgette A Carr, “Incorporating a ‘Best Interests of the Child’ Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure,” 
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal, 2009, 120–49. 
32 Timothy P Fadgen and Dana E Prescott, “Do the Best Interests of the Child End at the Nation’s Shores? Immigration, 
State Courts, and Children in the United States,” American Academy of Matrimonial Law 28, no. 359 (2016): 32. 
33 Erica Stief, “Impractical Relief and the Innocent Victims: How United States Immigration Law Ignores the Rights of 
Citizen Children,” UMKC Law Review 79 (2011 2010): 477. 
34 Erin B. Corcoran, “Deconstructing and Reconstructing Rights for Immigrant Children,” Harvard Latino Law Review 
18, no. 53 (2015).  
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The statute governing non-LPR cancellation is problematic even without a 
consideration of international norms. Its implementation under the 1996 IIRIRA has been 
characterized as a drastic response to popular pressure which, in the absence of 
fundamental procedural safeguards including judicial review, has enormous potential for 
arbitrary and unjust decisions.35 Scholars note that Congress’ failure to provide a clear 
definition of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” has led to uncertainty and 
unpredictability in decision-making.36  
Scholars suggest various approaches to addressing the harsh and unjust law. 
Reform to non-LPR cancellation is viewed as a practical and possible short-term solution 
in a political climate that is not conducive to larger-scale change.37 Lucy Twimasi 
recommends a new interpretation of the hardship standard, measured less subjectively in 
terms of “loss,” rather than “hardship.”38 Other scholars recommends reverting to pre-
1996 immigration laws39 or implementing new laws through legislation such as the Child 
Citizen Protection Act (CCPA).40  
A smaller group of scholars propose reform of non-LPR cancellation of removal 
based on the “best interests” standard. Molly Sutter examines the conflict between the 
hardship standard and international law and suggests a wide range of reforms both of the 
                                                        
35 William Underwood, “Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of 
Deportation Cases,” Indiana Law Journal 72, no. 3 (July 1, 1997). 
36 Twimasi, “Hardship Reconstructed”; Margaret Taylor, “What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation - Rationalizing 
Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief from Removal,” Journal of Law & Policy 30, no. 527 (2015). 
37 Taylor, “What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation.” 
38 Twimasi, “Hardship Reconstructed.” 
39 U.C. Berkeley International Human Rights Law Clinic, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and 
Diversity, and U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic, “In the Child’s Best Interest? The Consequences of Losing a 
Lawful Immigrant Parent to Deportation,” March 2010.  
40 U.C. Berkeley International Human Rights Law Clinic, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and 
Diversity, and U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic. (recommending that Congress enact the CCPA); Applied Research 
Center (now Race Forward), “Shattered Families.”(recommending that Congress reinstate judicial discretion to 
consider the best interests of children and families in decisions about deportation i.e., the Child Citizen Protection Act). 
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immigration system and the “best interests” standard itself.41 Satya Kaskade examines the 
ways in which the deportation of undocumented immigrants affects citizen children and 
analyzes the CCPA, which would amend the cancellation statute to include a “best 
interests” consideration when the qualifying relative is a child.42  
III. Argument and Outline 
Despite a growing body of research that criticizes the United States’ failure to 
adopt a child-centered standard both in immigration law broadly and in non-LPR 
cancellation of removal, the adjudication of the hardship standard has not changed. In the 
current political climate, legislative and policy changes remain extremely unlikely. 
Rather than focusing on the policy side, this thesis takes a legal approach, arguing not 
only that the U.S. should incorporate a “best interests” principle into the hardship 
standard, but that it is bound to do so under international law.   
Chapter 1 examines the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, arguing that 
both the Convention itself and Article 3, the “best interests” principle, have risen to the 
status of customary international law, and are therefore binding on the United States. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the legal principles of statutory interpretation, arguing that the 
hardship standard is ambiguous and therefore must be interpreted in a way that accords 
with customary international law. Chapter 3 outlines the differences between the hardship 
standard and the “best interests” standard, demonstrating that – despite caselaw 
suggesting otherwise – the two forms of assessment are considerably different from one 
another with respect to both procedural and substantive considerations. The concluding 
                                                        
41 Molly Hazel Sutter, “Mixed-Status Families and Broken Homes: The Clash between the U.S. Hardship Standard in 
Cancellation of Removal Proceedings and International Law,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 15 (2006 
2005): 783. 
42 Satya Kaskade, “Mothers Without Borders: Undocumented Immigrant Mothers Facing Deportation and the Best 
Interests of Their U.S. Citizen Children,” William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice 15, no. 2 
(February 1, 2009): 447. 
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chapter outlines changes necessary to bring the hardship standard in compliance with the 
CRC and Article 3, the “best interests of the child” principle.  
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CHAPTER 1: IS THE UNITED STATES BOUND BY THE CRC?  
 
The United States is the only country in the world that has failed to ratify the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). However, this does not 
excuse the U.S. from adhering to the Convention or its guiding principle, the “best 
interests of the child.” This chapter argues that, because of its widespread ratification and 
acceptance in courts around the world, the CRC has become customary international law 
(CIL) and is therefore binding on the United States. It further argues that the “best 
interests” principle has itself become a tenet of customary international law, due to its 
widespread use both in and outside of the United States. It concludes with an examination 
of existing caselaw relevant to this argument in the cancellation of removal context, 
under both sections of INA § 240A. 
Part I provides a background on the CRC and the best interests principle. Part II 
examines the United States’ obligations as a signatory to the Convention. Parts III and IV 
argue that the CRC and best interests principle respectively are customary international 
law. Part V examines the authority of customary international law in the United States, 
and Part VI outlines relevant caselaw.  
I. The CRC and the “Best Interests” Principle: Background  
The “best interests of the child” concept is a longstanding principle of domestic 
and international law. The principle emerged at the turn of the 20th Century, as traditional 
notions of children as property were replaced with more progressive ideas about child 
welfare and rights.43 Reformist discourse in the late 19th century began to introduce the 
idea of children as individual rights-bearers. The movement was not without controversy, 
                                                        
43 David B. Thronson, “Kids Will Be Kids - Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration 
Law,” Immigration and Nationality Law Review 23 (2002): 3. 
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but it eventually led to a broad acceptance that “control of children by parents, or the 
States, is not absolute and children have rights.”44 The United States was at the forefront 
of the “best interests” movement, using the principle in family law, particularly in cases 
of child custody and abuse, and creating special juvenile courts in the early 1800s.45  
The “best interests principle” emerged as a rule of international law in the mid-
20th century. The process of establishing international standards on children’s rights 
began in 1924, when the League of Nations adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child.46 This first Declaration focused primarily on the “care” and “protection” of 
children, rather than giving children the power to exercise rights.47 The 1959 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child took a step towards a more rights-centered 
approach, incorporating the principle that “the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration.”48 Both Declarations were important developments in the 
children’s rights movement, but neither placed any direct obligations on states.49 
The most important development of the “best interests” principle came with the 
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The CRC represented a “fundamental 
shift away from the notion of a child as a passive dependent” and codified “a vision of a 
child as an independent bearer of a unique, tailored set of human rights.”50 This approach 
was based on the principle that “children possess not only the rights reserved to all 
persons, but may also claim special assistance in effectuating those rights because of their 
                                                        
44 Thronson. p. 981 
45 Carr, “Incorporating a ‘Best Interests of the Child’ Approach.” p. 125 
46 Jonathan Todres, “Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and Its Early Case Law,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30, no. 159 (1998). p. 161 
47 Cynthia Price Cohen, “The Role of the United States in Drafting the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” Emory 
International Law Review 20 (1998): 185–98. 
48 Todres, “Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child.” p. 162 
49 Todres. 
50 Jason M. Pobjoy, The Child in International Refugee Law, Cambridge Asylum and Migration Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798430. 
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youth.”51 The CRC quickly became the most widely ratified human rights treaty in 
history: all UN Member states except the United States have ratified the Convention.52 
The civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights articulated in the Convention 
constitute the “minimum standards that States must ensure for every child within their 
jurisdiction.”53 Unlike the prior Declarations, the CRC is legally binding on states that 
have ratified it. 
The advancement of the best interests of the child is the central principle of the 
CRC.54 Article 3(1) states that: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken 
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” As the 
“umbrella provision” of the Convention, Article 3 entails a consideration of all other 
articles in the Convention.55 Article 3 is interpreted broadly and encompasses any action 
that directly or indirectly affects children. It does not require that the child’s best interests 
be the only criteria, or even the paramount criteria (as in the previous Declaration), but 
they must be “a primary” consideration.56 
A best interests assessment should be made “at every stage of the process in 
preparation for any decision that impacts the child’s life.”57 As such, Article 3 is engaged 
“whenever a child may be affected by an immigration decision.”58 The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has stated that in order to be in compliance with the Convention, 
migration policies, practices and decisions that are made in relation to the “entry, stay or 
                                                        
51 Thronson, “Kids Will Be Kids - Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law.” p. 
989 
52 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
53 Committee on the Rights of the Child, “The Rights of All Children in the Context of International Migration,” 
Background Paper, 2012 Day of General Discussion, August 2012. 
54 Todres, “Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child.” 
55 Todres. 
56 Todres. 
57 Committee on the Rights of the Child, “The Rights of All Children in the Context of International Migration.” 
58 Pobjoy, The Child in International Refugee Law. p. 223  
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return of a child and/or of his or her parents” must be determined by the principle of the 
best interests of the child.59 
A second fundamental principle of the CRC is the importance of the views of the 
child. Article 12 grants “to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the 
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child 
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”60 Early 
“best interests” models often excluded the views of the child from the process, with the 
identification of those interests made entirely by adults. Under the Convention, children 
have a voice and are entitled to play a role in the identification of their best interests.61 
These two fundamental principles – the best interests of the child and the importance of 
the child’s views – place the child at the center of the decision-making process.  
II. U.S. Obligations as Signatory to the CRC 
Although the United States played a pivotal role in the drafting of the CRC, it 
never ratified the Convention. During the drafting process, from 1979 to 1989, the U.S. 
proposed more articles than any other nation, including Article 10, the right to family 
reunification.62 The Clinton Administration signed the Convention in 1995 but did not 
submit it to the Senate for ratification primarily because of strong opposition from 
Congress.63 Opposition stemmed from concerns regarding domestic law and sovereignty, 
and conservative views regarding the freedom of parents to raise their children as they 
see fit.64 During the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama stated that his Administration 
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would review the treaty, and reiterated this support in 2011 and 2013.65 Despite these 
statements, the Convention was never sent to the Senate for ratification. 
However, as a signatory to the CRC, the United States does have obligations 
under the Convention. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, a nation that has signed a treaty must refrain from “acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty” until it has made clear its intention not to become party to 
the treaty.66 The U.S. has made no such statement, and therefore cannot engage in acts 
that defeat the object and purpose of the convention, namely the protection and 
advancement of the best interests of the child. The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) has acknowledged these obligations in the context of children’s rights 
during the asylum process, stating in its 1998 guidelines that the provisions of the CRC 
“provide guidance” and that, as a signatory, the United States is obliged to “refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.”67  
III. The CRC as Customary International Law 
According to contemporary theory, the Convention on the Rights of the Child is 
customary international law. Customary international law is, by its nature, indeterminate 
and has thus been the subject of much debate. The definition of customary international 
law has evolved over time, from a rigid definition to a more fluid and flexible process. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”68 Traditionally, 
this has been determined by two elements: the consistent practice of states and the 
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determination (by the practicing state) that the practice is being undertaken out of a sense 
of legal obligation, or opinio juris.69 Contemporary scholarship has shifted the weight on 
the second element, legal obligation, placing the role of international legal opinion – 
something which can evolve relatively quickly – above the role of state practice.70 This 
means that customary international law can be created more quickly and bind a wider 
group of nations than in the past.71  
Under contemporary theory, a treaty can become customary international law if it 
has been widely ratified by a representative group of nations. An ICJ decision in 1969 
held that widely ratified multilateral conventions or treaties can form customary 
international law binding on all states, rather than just the signatories.72 In the landmark 
ruling, North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ explained that a conventional law (binding 
only on those who have ratified the convention) can become a customary law (binding on 
all) as the result of “widespread and representative participation in the convention.”73 
Scholarship on the subject subsequently held that ratification by a large number of parties 
constitutes evidence that “these provisions are generally acceptable, and that indeed they 
have been generally accepted.”74 Generally accepted provisions constitute clear evidence 
of opinio juris, one of the two traditional building blocks for customary law generation.75 
The CRC has been widely ratified and consistently used by states. The CRC is an 
internationally agreed treaty which has been ratified not only by a representative group of 
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nations, but “the representative group of nations.”76 This overwhelming support “clearly 
makes it a piece of international customary law.”77 Since its entry into force in 1989, the 
Convention has been cited in courts across the world. Within the first ten years of its 
existence, the CRC was cited in at least 13 legal systems across a range of cases, 
including immigration.78 A database created by the Child’s Rights International Network 
(CRIN) includes over 100 cases that have cited the CRC and its provisions, spread across 
Europe (38), the Americas (35), Africa (21), Asia (20) and Oceania (20).79 
Furthermore, contemporary scholarship illustrates that customary international 
law can develop over a relatively short period of time. Under traditional theory, 
consistent practice over an “extended period of time” was necessary for a treaty to 
become customary international law.80 However, in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
ruling, the ICJ found that just a “short period” of time could be sufficient for this 
transformation to take place.81 Therefore, the fact that the CRC is a relatively new 
Convention does not disqualify it from becoming CIL. 
IV. The “Best Interests” Principle as Customary International Law 
In theory, a state may opt out of customary international law by making a verbal 
objection (although failure to ratify a Convention does not qualify as such).82 However, 
there are certain rules of customary international law, jus cogens norms, that are 
considered so vital that they cannot be “contracted out” by states.83 Similarly, obligations 
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erga omnes are so important that any state has jurisdiction to sue another state which is 
failing to meet those obligations.84 Opinio juris generally determines what norms become 
jus cogens and what obligations become erga omnes.85 The prohibition of genocide, 
slavery, and torture are traditional examples of jus cogens norms. 
Contemporary scholarship and jurisprudence have expanded the theory of jus 
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations. In the 1964 decision, Barcelona Traction, the 
ICJ held that the “basic rights of human persons” created erga omnes obligations.86 This 
led to a new understanding of the sources of international law, by which human rights 
norms could be “seamlessly transmuted into customary international law.”87 Fundamental 
rights can become customary international law simply by virtue of their inclusion in 
multilateral conventions. The theory of “customary law generation” holds that widely 
ratified conventions with prohibitions against torture, genocide, or slavery form 
confirmation of customary international law on all state parties, not just the signatories.88 
In this way, conventions themselves “generate customary rules of law.”89 
Under this theory, the rights in the CRC may be considered obligations erga 
omnes, binding upon the U.S. despite non-ratification.90 This applies in particular to 
Article 3, because of its widespread use across states and its existence in other 
international conventions.91 The best interests principle has become a “ubiquitous feature 
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of international treaties and the reasoning of international institutions.”92 Furthermore, the 
“best interests” principle existed before the CRC, and has been a consistent feature of 
U.S. family law for two centuries.93  
The United States’ use of the “best interests” principle in areas of the law outside 
immigration reinforces its place as a widely accepted and used principle of law. Under 
current laws, courts must consider the best interests of the child in all decisions regarding 
placement and custody determinations, safety and permanency planning, and proceedings 
for termination of parental rights.94 All states have statutes requiring that the “best 
interests” be considered whenever certain decisions are made regarding “a child’s 
custody, placement, or other critical life issues.”95 Although state guidelines for assessing 
the best interests principle differ, many guidelines echo articles of the CRC. Across state 
laws, common guiding principles include the importance of family integrity and 
preference for avoiding the removal of a child from his or her home;96 the importance of 
promoting the health, safety and protection of the child;97 and assurances that any child 
removed from their home will receive care that will assist the child in developing into a 
self-sufficient adult.98  
Although the “best interests” principle does not exist in immigration law 
generally, it is used in Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). SIJS was created in 
1990 – the year after the CRC came into force – as an avenue to legal immigration status 
for children who become juvenile court dependents as a result of being victims of abuse 
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and neglect.99 A child can gain LPR status through SIJS after she is declared dependent 
on a juvenile court, found eligible for long-term foster care, and a determination is made 
that it is not in the child’s best interests to be returned to her home country.100 The best 
interests determination in SIJS follows state, rather than federal, guidelines and 
procedures. The existence of the best interests principle in family law and SIJS reinforces 
its status as a principle of customary international law.  
V. Authority of Customary International Law in the US 
The United States has long recognized the binding nature of customary 
international law. The Paquete Habana, a case involving the seizure of fishing vessels 
during the Spanish-American War, provides the foundation for U.S. understanding of 
customary international obligations. In the decision, the Supreme Court held that 
“international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon 
it are duly presented for their determination.”101 The Court explained that customary 
international law may originate “in custom or comity, courtesy or concession,” which 
over time grows “by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of 
international law.”102 
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the influence that standards of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the practices of other nations can have on U.S. 
law. In the 2005 case, Roper v. Simmons, the court drew on customary international law 
and international jurisprudence in its decision to abolish the death penalty for juveniles. 
Literature in the years leading up to the decision had advanced the argument that Article 
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37 of the CRC, the prohibition of juvenile capital punishment, should be considered a 
norm of jus cogens.103 In the decision, the Court acknowledged that, in light of the 
almost-universal ratification of the CRC, “the United States now stands alone in a world 
that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”104 Although not determinative 
or binding in the United States, the “opinion of the world community” provides 
“respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”105 The Court also 
stated that the experience of the United Kingdom, a country which had abolished the 
juvenile death penalty 56 years prior, “bears particular relevance” in light of “historic 
ties.”106 As Chapter 3 illustrates, the U.K. – along with the EU, Australia and Canada – 
may similarly useful in providing a model for a more humane interpretation of the 
cancellation of removal statute. 
VI. The CRC and “Best Interests” in Cancellation of Removal Caselaw 
There has been some examination of the role of the CRC and the “best interests” 
principle in the cancellation of removal context. In a case that involved LPR cancellation 
of removal under INA § 240A(a), the District Court of New York accepted the CRC as 
customary international law.107 In the 2002 decision, Beharry v. Reno, the court held that 
the cancellation statute must be interpreted in a way that is in compliance with the 
Convention. The case involved a habeas petition for a U.S. LPR and citizen of Trinidad 
who was ineligible for relief because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The 
petitioner, who had a U.S. citizen daughter, argued that, under international law, he 
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should be granted a hearing to illustrate the effect deportation would have on his 
daughter.108 
In its decision, the District Court determined that the CRC has become customary 
international law. Recognizing that customary law is “not static, but rather is subject to 
change over time as customs change,” the court stated that a law becomes customary 
through “broad and long-term acceptance” – or one of the two, if it strong enough.109 
Because of the “overwhelming acceptance” of the CRC and the fact that it contains 
“provisions codifying longstanding legal norms” such as the best interests principle, the 
court held that the CRC should be read as CIL.110 As such, the court granted the 
petitioner a writ of habeas corpus. Although the Second Circuit later reversed the 
decision, in Beharry v. Aschroft, the reversal was made on other grounds: the petitioner 
had failed to exhaust all possible remedies before appealing, and therefore both courts 
lacked jurisdiction to review the claim.111 
The statements in Beharry v. Reno have formed the basis for later arguments 
concerning the applicability of the CRC and “best interests” principle for cancellation of 
removal under both INA § 240A(a) and 240A(b). Between 2005 and 2016, seven Circuit 
Courts considered appeals against cancellation of removal cases based on arguments 
relating to the CRC and the best interests of the child (See Table 1). Two of these were, 
like Beharry v. Ashcroft, dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.112 
In each case where the court did have jurisdiction, it failed to determine whether 
or not the CRC is customary international law, instead basing arguments on one (or both) 
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of two secondary issues. Each court makes their argument based on a hypothetical 
scenario in which the CRC is customary law. The first issue raised is the rules governing 
statutory interpretation in light of customary international law: The Second, Third and 
Sixth Circuits have employed arguments that the statute “controls” over customary 
international law, since it constitutes a clear expression of congressional intent.113 This 
issue is addressed in Chapter 2. The second issue is compliance of the hardship standard 
with the Convention: The Ninth and Sixth Circuits have argued that the hardship standard 
already entails a consideration of the “best interests of the child,” and is therefore already 
in compliance with the CRC.114 This issue is addressed in Chapter 3.  
Case Petitioner's argument Court opinion 
Cabrera-Alvarez v. 
Gonzales (9th Cir. 
2005) 
Statute should be 
interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the CRC.  
Assuming CRC is customary international 
law, statute involves consideration of best 
interests. Denied. 
Torres v. Gonzales 
(9th Cir. 2005) 
Best interests should be 
considered under hardship 
standard.  
Best interests are at the core of hardship 
analysis. Denied.  
Oliva v. United 
States DOJ (2nd 
Cir. 2005) 
Petitioner should be 
permitted to apply for 
relief under CRC. 
CRC not ratified and international law 
inapplicable because statute controls (and 
petitioner fails under physical presence 
requirement). Denied.  
Vazquez v. 
Gonzales (9th Cir. 
2006) 
Removal results in 
deprivation of children's 
rights under CRC. 
Statute does not violate CRC, removal 
would not deprive children of rights. 
Dismissed in part, denied in part.  
Santana-Medina v. 
Holder (1st Cir. 
2010) 
Best interests assessment 
required under CRC. 
Petitioner failed to make this argument 
before the IJ or the BIA, therefore 
waived. Dismissed. 
Flores-Nova v. AG 
of the United 
States (3rd Cir. 
2011) 
Statute conflicts with best 
interests principle of CRC 
(part of argument).  
Assuming CRC is customary international 
law, statute controls. Petitioner fails under 
physical presence requirement. Denied. 
Bamaca-Perez v. 
Lynch (6th Cir. 
2016) 
Best interests should be 
considered under hardship 
standard.  
Statutory standard applies, not CRC. If 
CRC relevant, statute does consider best 
interests. Denied. 
Table 1: Existing Caselaw on the CRC and “Best Interests” under INA § 240A(b) 
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VII. Conclusion 
This Chapter has argued that the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
Article 3, the “best interests” principle, should be considered customary international law. 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that the Convention is customary law, due to its 
almost-universal ratification and consistent use by nations. There is also evidence that the 
“best interests” principle, a longstanding legal norm which is regularly used in U.S. 
domestic law, is customary international law. Supreme Court precedent emphasizes both 
the binding nature of CIL and the authoritative weight of the CRC, demonstrating that the 
Convention must be considered in domestic law. 
Although some litigation has been conducted regarding the applicability of the 
CRC and “best interests” principle in the context of cancellation of removal, these 
arguments have, so far, been unsuccessful. The following chapters address the two main 
arguments that Circuit Courts have employed in denying petitions based on the CRC and 
“best interests” principle. Chapter 2 examines the principles of statutory interpretation, 
assessing the issue of whether the CRC is applicable in the context of relief under INA § 
240A(b). Chapter 3 addresses the issue of whether the hardship standard is in compliance 
with the Convention.  
 
  
  
24 
CHAPTER 2: AMBIGUITY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
  
 Chapter 1 demonstrated that the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
“best interests” principle should be considered customary international law. It also 
demonstrated that CIL is, in general, binding on the United States. However, the 
relationship between customary law and domestic law is not straightforward or well-
understood.115 Although CIL is recognized as a source of law in U.S. domestic courts, it 
does not necessarily trump domestic law: both types of law are of equal importance. As 
such, the principles of statutory interpretation must be examined in order to understand 
whether the CRC applies under the statute governing cancellation of removal for non-
LPRs, INA § 240A(b). According to the Charming Betsy canon, a statute that is 
ambiguous must be interpreted in a way that accords with international law. If, on the 
other hands, the statute is unambiguous and expresses the clear intent of Congress, then 
the statute controls. 
This chapter contends that the hardship provision of the statute is ambiguous and 
therefore should be interpreted in accordance with the CRC. Part I outlines the Charming 
Besty canon of statutory interpretation and Part II examines the legal concept of 
ambiguity. Parts III and IV analyze existing caselaw concerning ambiguity under INA § 
240A(a) and (b) respectively. Finally, Part V examines the ambiguity of the hardship 
standard under INA § 240A(b)(D), concluding that the standard is ambiguous and should 
therefore be interpreted in a way that accords with the CRC and “best interests” principle.  
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I. The Charming Betsy and Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
The juridical relationship between international law and domestic law, two 
legitimate and equal sources of law in the United States, is governed by several long-
standing principles. These principles serve as “rules of decision for resolving in domestic 
courts the potential inconsistencies between external and internal sources of law.”116 
They also express the Supreme Court’s view that domestic and international law are two 
“legitimate sources of norms binding on the United States and enforceable in its 
courts.”117 The most relevant principles concerning customary international law come 
from two historic Supreme Court decisions: the Paquete Habana (discussed in Chapter 1) 
and the Charming Betsy. The Paquete Habana established the principle that CIL can 
provide a rule of decision in the absence of controlling legislative or executive acts.118 
The Charming Betsy created the principle that domestic statutes should be interpreted, 
when possible, so as not to violate international law.119  
According to the Paquete Habana, customary international law applies when 
there is no controlling legislative or executive act. As explained in Chapter 1, the Paquete 
Habana established the importance of customary international law in domestic courts. 
However, the decision qualified this by stating that customary law must be consulted 
when there is “no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.”120 In the 
case of non-LPR cancellation of removal, there is clearly a statute, but it is not clear 
whether or not the statute should “control” in the case of a conflict with the CRC. This 
issue is addressed in the Charming Betsy.  
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According the Charming Betsy canon, ambiguous congressional statutes should 
be construed in harmony with customary international law. The canon originated with the 
Supreme Court decision, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy. The 1804 case involved 
the application of international norms regarding the capture of neutral nations and their 
citizens in wartime and an Act of Congress which prohibited trade.121 In the decision, 
Chief Justice Marshall stated that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”122 In essence, the 
Charming Betsy doctrine acts as a “rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend 
to place the United States in breach of international law.”123 To rebut this presumption, 
Congress must provide an “affirmative expression of congressional intent”124 to 
“abrogate the international agreement.”125 
The Charming Besty canon has been the subject of some debate, but has become 
“deeply embedded in American jurisprudence.”126 The Supreme Court and federal courts 
apply the Charming Betsy principle regularly, and  it is enshrined in the provisions of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.127 The 
Restatement, which outlines the American Law Institute’s opinion on the rules that a 
tribunal should apply when deciding a controversy in accordance with international law, 
states that “[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to 
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.”128 
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Such a construal will be possible when the statute at issue allows some degree of 
ambiguity in its interpretation.    
More recent jurisprudence and statutory guidance affirms the importance of the 
Charming Betsy canon. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 
the Supreme Court applied the Charming Betsy principle to avoid construing the National 
Labor Relations Act in a manner inconsistent with State Department regulations.129 The 
Court based its ruling in part on the fact that there was no clear expression of Congress’ 
intent, and that proposed construction would have been contrary to a “well-established 
rule of international law.”130 In United States v. Yousef, a 2002 decision involving the 
conviction of terrorist acts conducted outside the United States, the Second Circuit Court 
reaffirmed the Charming Betsy principle. The Court stated that “while it is permissible 
for United States law to conflict with customary international law, where legislation is 
susceptible to multiple interpretations, the interpretation that does not conflict with ‘the 
law of nations’ is preferred.”131  
II. What is Ambiguity?  
The determination of statutory ambiguity is a prerequisite to the application of the 
Charming Betsy principle, but there is considerable debate regarding what constitutes 
ambiguity. Courts have not provided a definitive answer, despite the fact that the 
Charming Betsy canon has guided U.S. courts for over two centuries.132 Scholars 
emphasize the difficulty posed by the Charming Betsy: decision-makers have often been 
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starkly split on whether a statute is ambiguous.133 This can be explained by the simple 
fact that clarity is “very much in the eyes of the beholder.”134 
An examination of the broader legal principle of ambiguity sheds some light on 
the issue. Somewhat ironically, the meaning of “ambiguity” is subject to multiple 
interpretations.135 As a result, expert testimony of linguists is frequently called upon in 
order to “convince the court of the presence of ambiguity or vagueness.”136 According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, ambiguity is “doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning; 
indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument.”137 
An ambiguity may be either “latent” or “patent.” A latent ambiguity occurs when the 
language may be clear and intelligible, but an extrinsic fact creates the necessity for 
interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings. A patent ambiguity 
“appears on the face of the instrument,” arising from “defective, obscure, or insensible 
language.”138 
Ambiguity in legal texts can be categorized in two further senses: a general 
meaning and a more restrictive, legal meaning – both of which have been used by courts. 
In its “general meaning,” ambiguity relates to the way language is “used by speakers or 
writers and understood by listeners or readers.”139 In this sense, ambiguity can be lack of 
clarity in language; a word or phrase that is capable of being understood in more senses 
than one. General ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.140 In its more 
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restrictive meaning, ambiguity occurs “where there is a lack of clarity or when there is 
uncertainty about the application of a term.”141 This can occur, for example, when the 
word “treaty” could be understood to involve several different types of international 
instruments, and the list of instruments is not clarified.142 Within the law, there has been 
considerable overlap of these terms, with courts employing the term in its general 
meaning as well as its restricted meaning.143  
III. Ambiguity under INA § 240A(a): Beharry and Guaylupo-Moya 
The most thorough assessment of the Charming Betsy in the cancellation of 
removal context is in relation to first part of the statue, INA § 240A(a), which governs 
relief for lawful permanent residents. In Beharry v. Reno, the Court held not only that the 
CRC is customary international law (as examined in Chapter 1), but also that, in light of 
the Charming Betsy, it is legally enforceable. The petitioner argued that, under principles 
of CIL, including the CRC, he should be granted a hearing to demonstrate the effect his 
deportation would have on his family and himself. The Court granted the petition, finding 
that his deportation could be unlawful without a consideration of the impact the 
deportation would have upon the petitioner’s daughter.144 
In its decision, the court argued that because Congress has not enacted legislation 
which shows clear intent to repeal the norms of the CRC, the Convention is binding. The 
court drew on the interaction of the Paquete Habana and Charming Betsy principles to 
argue that “since Congress may overrule customary international law (Paquete Habana), 
but laws are to be read in conformity with international law where possible (Charming 
Betsy), it follows that in order to overrule customary international law, Congress must 
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enact domestic legislation which both postdates the development of a customary 
international law norm, and which clearly has the intent of repealing that norm.”145 
In making this argument, the Beharry court cited an earlier decision, Maria v. 
McElroy, which recognized that in the absence of a statement to the contrary, Congress 
can be assumed to be legislating “in conformity with international law.”146 The court also 
cited a provision in the Restatement, that an Act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of 
international law as U.S. law “if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or 
provision is clear and if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly 
reconciled.”147 Therefore, the Beharry court determined that “customary international law 
is legally enforceable unless superseded by a clear statement from Congress.” 
Although the Beharry decision addressed the issue of Congressional intent, it 
failed to examine the issue of ambiguity, a fact for which it was subsequently criticized. 
In Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, a case which involved similar facts, the Second Circuit 
argued that the statutory prohibition of relief for aggravated felons was unambiguous.148 
The Guaylupo-Moya court agreed with the Beharry court to a limited degree but 
questioned some of its reasoning. The court recognized that the Beharry decision applied 
“the Charming Betsy principle that, where legislation is ambiguous, it should be 
interpreted to conform to international law.”149 However, the Guaylupo-Moya court 
explained that the Charming Betsy “comes into play only where Congress’s intent is 
ambiguous.” Because there are clear sections in IIRIRA which restrict relief for 
aggravated felons and expand the definition of aggravated felony, “Congress’s intent is 
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controlling.”150 The Beharry court fell short in its reasoning primarily because it failed 
determine whether the relevant provisions of the statute were ambiguous. The Guaylopo-
Moya court found that, in the case of the bar on relief for on aggravated felons, governed 
under INA § 240A(a)(C), there was no ambiguity. 
The Guaylopo-Moya decision emphasizes the importance of assessing ambiguity 
in order to determine the role of that the CRC may play in the application of that statute. 
The decision also provides evidence that a particular provision of a statute, in this case 
section (C) of INA § 240(a), can be assessed individually. The ruling that INA § 
240A(a)(C) is unambiguous does not preclude an ambiguity finding in another part of the 
statute.  
IV. Ambiguity under INA § 240A(b): Oliva, Flores-Nova, Bamaca-Perez 
 
Later cases have drawn on the reasoning in both Beharry and Gaylupo-Moya to 
assess the issue of ambiguity and statutory interpretation under non-LPR cancellation of 
removal. Three Circuit Court decisions have examined the interpretation of INA § 
240A(b) in the context of the CRC as customary international law. In 2005 and 2011, the 
Second and Third Circuit Courts argued that the statute controls over the CRC.151 
However, neither court determined whether the hardship requirement of the statute 
(§240A(b)(1)(D)) was unambiguous, instead focusing on the physical presence 
requirement (§240A(b)(1)(B)), which neither petitioner had met. In 2016, the Sixth 
Circuit cited these two decisions as precedent in making a broader argument that the 
Congressional statute controls.152 The court failed, however, to address the issue of 
ambiguity. 
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In Oliva v. United States DOJ, the Second Circuit argued that, even if the CRC 
and Article 3 have risen to the status of customary international law, the statute controls. 
The case involved a Guatemalan father of a U.S. citizen child, who had been denied 
cancellation of removal. The petitioner argued that the BIA erred as a matter of law by 
failing to permit him to apply for relief under the CRC, and that he could not be removed 
without a hearing considering whether his removal was in the best interests of his U.S. 
citizen son. The court addressed the Beharry and Guaylupo-Moya issue, arguing that the 
Charming Betsy canon “does not apply where the statute at issue admits no relevant 
ambiguity.”153 In its analysis, the court explained that the first three parts of the statute 
are primary requirements – physical presence, good moral character, and no specified 
offenses – necessary for a consideration under the hardship requirement. The court 
argued that in this case “no ambiguity can be discerned in the timeliness requirement” 
because the statute “clearly limits relief based on family hardship to aliens who have been 
continuously physically present in the United States for ten years.”154 The petitioner 
failed to fulfill one of the primary requirements, so was not entitled to a hardship 
consideration or any kind of best interests assessment that that might involve. The court 
therefore did not need to address the issue of whether the hardship requirement is 
ambiguous.  
In 2011, the Third Circuit echoed the Oliva reasoning in Flores-Nova v. AG of the 
United States. The case involved similar facts: the Mexican parents of three U.S. citizen 
children had been denied cancellation of removal. The couple failed to meet the 
continuous physical presence requirement, having left the country for a period exceeding 
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90 days.155 The petitioners made several claims, including the argument that the 
cancellation of removal statute does not comply with customary law as expressed in 
Article 3 of the CRC. The Court dismissed this claim, arguing that “Article 3(1) is not 
binding on the United States or this Court to the extent that it conflicts with 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b),156 in which Congress set forth the extent to which a child’s hardship may be 
considered in determining eligibility for cancellation of removal.”157 
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit relied in part on Oliva and Flores-Nova to make a 
broader argument that the entire statute – rather than simply the physical presence 
requirement – controls over the CRC.158 The case, Bamaca-Perez v. Lynch, involved a 
Guatemalan father of two U.S. citizen children, who had been denied relief under the 
hardship standard. The petitioner contended that the “best interests of the child” must be 
considered as an explicit factor in the hardship analysis when the qualifying relative is a 
child. In a short decision, the court denied the petition, citing the Paquete Habana and 
Oliva to argue that resort to international law is appropriate in the absence of a treaty, 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision. 
Relying on Oliva, Flores-Nova and Payne-Barahona, the Bamaca-Perez court 
argued that, since Congress has enacted legislation establishing “the applicable standard 
for cancellation of removal,” it is that standard, rather than Article 3(1) of the CRC, 
which applies.159 These citations are misplaced: as already examined, both Oliva and 
Flores-Nova focus on the narrower issue of the physical presence requirement, while 
Payne-Barahona concerns the bar to relief for LPRs who have been convicted of 
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aggravated felonies. In all three cases, the court makes an ambiguity assessment and 
determines that the statute is clear. The Bamaca-Perez Court fails to make such a 
determination, falling into the same trap as the Beharry court.  
Therefore, although several courts have addressed the issue of statutory 
interpretation in the case of potential ambiguity in the hardship standard, none have 
clearly addressed the issue of whether the hardship standard is ambiguous. Indeed, in 
Bamaca-Perez, the Court went on to make a secondary argument: that the inquiry does 
involve a best interests determination (see Chapter 3), perhaps recognizing that it had 
failed to adequately address the issue of statutory interpretation. Since no court has 
determined whether the hardship standard is ambiguous or not, there is room for 
arguments that it is ambiguous. Furthermore, these cases illustrate that a single provision 
of a statute can be interpreted as ambiguous or unambiguous. Therefore, an argument can 
be made for the ambiguity of just the hardship section of the non-LPR cancellation of 
removal statute, INA § 240A(b)(D).  
V. The Ambiguity of the Hardship Standard: INA § 240A(b)(D) 
The history of the hardship standard in cancellation of removal law is one of 
ambiguity and varying interpretations. Congress first introduced the standard into what 
was then known as “suspension of removal” in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act. Under the Act, an applicant needed to provide proof of five years physical presence 
and evidence that deportation would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to the applicant’s citizen or LPR spouse, parent or child.160 The previous 
administrative remedy had been more lenient, allowing suspension of deportation if the 
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applicant could provide evidence of “serious economic detriment” on return.161 Under the 
1952 law, suspension of deportation was available in the “very limited” category of cases 
in which deportation would be “unconscionable.”162 Since then, the standard has been 
changed several times in part as a result of efforts to standardize its interpretation.163  
In 1962, Congress make the standard more lenient, dividing the statute into two 
categories so that individuals who were deportable on less serious grounds were subject 
to a lower “extreme hardship” standard.164 After this change, there was considerable 
controversy over what was required to prove extreme hardship and the standard was 
applied inconsistently.165 This culminated with the controversial 1996 BIA decision, 
Matter of O—J—O—. The case involved a citizen of Nicaragua who was granted relief 
despite having no family ties in the United States.166 The BIA based its decision primarily 
on his ties and assimilation in the United States and the economic and political conditions 
of Nicaragua.167 In the decision, the majority stated that “as evidenced by this very 
decision, and the decisions of this Board which have preceded it, the term ‘extreme’ in 
the statute is not readily defined, at least in its application.”168 Several board members 
dissented with the opinion and argued that the level of hardship did not rise to the 
sufficient level. One of the few matters of agreement between the majority and dissent is 
that the phrase “extreme hardship” is “ambiguous.”169 
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The hardship standard was altered again in the 1996 Illegal Immigrant Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), creating the current standard of relief. 
Congress stated that the applicant must show evidence of hardship “substantially beyond 
that which ordinarily would be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.”170 The 
accompanying Senate Report stated that a case with similar facts to O—J—O— would 
not be approved under the new standard.171 
Aside from that statement, though, Congress failed to give any further direction as 
to how the standard should be interpreted. Writing soon after the introduction of the new 
standard, one scholar noted that Congress has “never defined the ambiguous ‘extreme’ 
and ‘exceptional and extremely unusual’ hardship standards” and argued that the factors 
established in caselaw do “little in the way of providing content to the ambiguous 
phrase.”172 He further stated that “under any approach, it would be difficult to say that the 
term ‘extreme hardship’ is anything but ambiguous.”173 Later scholarship on the standard 
argues that there is “nothing predictable or even remotely rational about the current 
system for adjudicating applications for non-LPR cancellation.”174 
As a result of minimal guidance from Congress, the interpretation of the new 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard was left almost entirely to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals. Congress granted decision-makers “discretion” when 
determining the level of hardship that would qualify (unlike the physical presence and 
disqualifying crimes requirements, which are fixed), meaning that the decision-maker has 
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freedom in interpretation.175 This in and of itself constitutes evidence that the hardship 
requirement is subject to some level of ambiguity. The BIA’s three published decisions – 
Monreal, Andazola and Recinas – further demonstrate the ambiguity of the standard.  
In Matter of Monreal, the BIA examined the statutory language in depth in order 
to determine its meaning, but failed to fully resolve the issue of ambiguity. The Board 
stated that “the terms ‘exceptional’ and ‘extremely unusual’ seemingly have ordinary 
meanings.”176 Exceptional is defined as “forming an exception; not ordinary; uncommon; 
rare” and extremely unusual as “circumstances in which the exception to the norm is very 
uncommon.”177 However, the apparent “plain meaning” of these terms becomes less clear 
“when appended to the term hardship, which can have multiple manifestations and 
inherently introduces an element of subjectivity into this statutory phrase.”178 The court 
further noted that “if the past 50 years have demonstrated nothing else with regard to the 
phrases ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ and ‘extreme hardship,’ they have 
shown that reasonable people can agree that the meaning of these terms is ‘clear,’ but 
come to quite different conclusions as to their application in various factual situations.”179 
Despite their seemingly clear definitions, the hardship standards are not terms of “fixed 
and inflexible content or meaning.”180 Indeed, the Board members in the decision itself 
could not come to an agreement, with Lory Rosenberg submitting an eight-page 
dissenting opinion. 
Although the BIA in Monreal determined that Congress did intend to make this 
hardship standard higher than the last, it refrained from drawing on caselaw from the 
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previous “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, arguing that the 
standard was different yet again. Furthermore, the Board stated that “although guidance 
as to this term’s meaning can be provided, each term must be assessed and decided on its 
own facts.”181 The Board outlined a variety of factors that might be relevant in making 
the determination and did not foreclose any particular consideration of what can be 
considered in a hardship determination. As a result, the concept of hardship is open to 
change depending on the arguments made and evidence offered in each individual case. 
In Matter of Andazola, there was even more debate between Board members as to 
whether the hardship presented rose to the necessary level. The majority determined that 
the case could not be “meaningfully distinguish[ed]” from Matter of Monreal and denied 
relief.182 They argued that it was clearly Congress’ intent to narrow the class of 
noncitizens eligible for relief, and therefore that this hardship standard must do that. In 
the dissent, Board members recognized that the “challenge” of interpretation – stating 
that “reasonable persons can differ on whether a set of circumstances rise to the requisite 
hardship” and then criticizing the majority’s determination.183  
Both dissenting opinions questioned the majority’s interpretation of Congress’ 
intent. In the first dissent, Cecelia Espenoza and Lory Rosenberg argued that the likely 
outcome of this decision – that “no respondent from Mexico will qualify” without a 
relative who has “severe medical problems” – was not in line with Congress’ intent.184 In 
the second dissent, several more Board members argued that Congress did not intend to 
“make the standard so demanding that it becomes a bar to all but the rarest of cases.”185 
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The dissenting Board members argued that Congress accomplished its goal of narrowing 
the class of noncitizens eligible in several other ways, including the added 10-year 
physical presence requirement and the cap of 4,000 grants per year.  
In Matter of Recinas, the BIA further elaborated on the hardship standard, and, 
despite its extremely restrictive application of the standard in the two previous published 
decisions, found room to grant relief. In fact, the Court’s reasoning places it closer in line 
with the dissent in Andazola, stating that “the hardship standard is not so restrictive that 
only a handful of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying relative with a serious 
medical condition, will qualify for relief.”186 The Board’s inability to agree on 
Congressional intent within and between these three decisions clearly illustrates that 
multiple interpretations are possible, that Congressional intent is not clear, and therefore 
that the standard is ambiguous. 
VI. Conclusion 
In summary, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the hardship standard 
under the non-LPR cancellation of removal statute is ambiguous. Previous caselaw on the 
CRC and “best interests” fails to make a determination on this issue, leaving room for 
future litigation. Evidence of ambiguity in the standard can be found in the history of the 
development of the standard and the three published BIA decisions. Because of this 
ambiguity, the hardship standard should be interpreted in a way that brings it in line with 
a “best interests of the child” determination. The following chapter analyzes the counter-
argument that courts have made to this argument – that the hardship standard is already in 
line with the CRC – by examining the differences between the hardship standard and the 
best interests standard.   
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CHAPTER 3: HARDSHIP V. BEST INTERESTS: WHAT’S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
 
 Because of the ambiguity of the hardship standard, the non-LPR cancellation 
statute should be interpreted, as far as possible, in a manner that accords with Article 3 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Some courts have argued that the hardship 
standard already does this: that the “hardship” standard is merely the converse of the 
“best interests” standard, and therefore involves a best interests analysis. However, this 
argument is superficial and flawed. It fails to understand that a best interests assessment, 
as developed in international jurisprudence, entails both substantive and procedural 
considerations which are absent from the way in which the hardship standard is currently 
assessed. This Chapter examines the considerable differences between the two standards. 
Part I outlines the existing caselaw which argues that the standards are the same. Part II 
provides an initial rebuttal to this argument through an examination of Canadian caselaw. 
Parts III and IV outline the key procedural and substantive differences between the 
standards.  
I. Best Interests as the Converse of Hardship: Existing Caselaw  
 
The Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts have both argued that the hardship and best 
interests assessments are synonymous. In Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the petitioner’s claim that the court should consider the CRC’s best interests 
standard in assessing hardship to his two U.S. citizen children. The case involved family 
separation: the petitioner’s children would stay in the United States with their mother if 
their father were to be deported, because of the greater educational and economic 
opportunities.187 The court did not reject the claim the best interests of his children should 
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be considered, but argued that they had been considered under the hardship analysis. In 
assessing hardship, the court argued, the “child’s ‘best interests’ are precisely the issue 
before the agency, in the sense that ‘best interests’ are merely the converse of 
‘hardship.’”188 The court further contended that “the agency’s entire inquiry focuses on 
the qualifying children, making their interests a ‘primary consideration’ in the 
cancellation-of-removal analysis.”189 As such, the petitioner “fail[ed] to demonstrate that 
the agency’s interpretation or application of the statute is inconsistent with the 
Convention.”190 
Three later decisions followed the Cabrera-Alvarez reasoning. The Ninth Circuit 
cited Cabrera-Alvarez in Torres v. Gonalez (2005)191 and Vasquez v. Gonzales (2009).192 
In both cases, the petitioners had sought relief based on the argument that the court 
should consider the best interests of the child, within or instead of the statutory hardship 
standard. In short decisions, both courts denied relief based on the argument that the court 
had already done so. In the 2016 decision, Bamaca-Perez v. Lynch, the Sixth Circuit 
relied on the same argument.193 Citing Cabrera-Alvarez, the court argued that “best 
interests” are the converse of “hardship,” and since the agency’s inquiry focuses on the 
qualifying children, their best interests are a “primary consideration.”194 
These cases fail to conduct a thorough analysis of the factors involved in a best 
interests assessment, as required by international jurisprudence. A mere consideration of 
what might be (or not be) in the interests of a child does not amount to a best interests 
assessment under international law. In order to comply with the CRC, a best interests 
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assessment must follow specific procedural guidelines and address particular substantive 
considerations. 
II. International Caselaw: Canada 
 
An examination of the equivalent form of relief under Canadian immigration law 
provides an initial counter for the argument that “best interests” and “hardship” 
assessments are equivalent. Canada’s courts use both standards in their equivalent statute, 
humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) relief. In assessing H&C considerations, courts 
assess the level of hardship on the applicant and take into account “the best interests of a 
child directly affected.”195 Jurisprudence clearly establishes that these are two separate 
forms of analysis. According to the Supreme Court decision, Hawthorne v. Canada, the 
best interests of a child must always be assessed in H&C applications. In the decision, the 
Supreme Court stated that “the concept of ‘undeserved hardship’ is ill-suited when 
assessing the hardship on innocent children” because “children will rarely, if ever, be 
deserving of hardship.”196 
The Canadian Federal Court has reaffirmed the importance of separating the 
hardship analysis from the best interests analysis several times. In Williams v. Canada, 
the court overturned the decision of an asylum officer after determining that the Officer 
applied the “wrong test” by analyzing whether the removal would have a negative impact 
on the child to the extent where he would suffer “undue and undeserved or 
disproportionate hardship” rather than conducting a best interests assessment.197 In Arulaj 
v. Canada, the court held that it was an error in law to incorporate a hardship threshold 
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into the best interests analysis.198 Similarly, in Mangru v. Canada, the court determined 
that, because the application of the “hardship” threshold “permeates [the] analysis of the 
best interests of the children,” the decision-maker reached an “inappropriate 
conclusion.”199 This caselaw demonstrates that the two forms of assessment are different 
and should not be conflated.  
III. Procedural Differences 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the best interests assessment in Cabrera-Alvarez v. 
Gonalez fails to recognize that a best interests assessment entails a specific procedure in 
the context of parental deportation, which has been developed by international 
jurisprudence. The primary procedural differences are summarized in Table 2. The best 
interests assessment involves a two-step process, in which the best interests of the child 
are considered independently of and prior to any other factors. The second stage of this 
assessment involves a balancing exercise in which the best interests, as a primary 
consideration, are balanced against other factors. This entire assessment is a pure 
analysis, in that it examines only the situation of the child and applicant. An integral part 
of the procedure is the consideration of the views of the child: the child is given a voice 
and the decision-makers are obliged to listen.   
In contrast, under INA § 240A(b), the hardship analysis takes place after a 
consideration of countervailing factors. Although it contains a similar balancing exercise, 
the weight given to the best interests of the child is substantially less than in a best 
interests assessment. In contrast to the pure best interests analysis, the hardship 
assessment is comparative: adjudicators examine the hardship of the child as compared to 
that which would ordinarily be expected. The outcome of this comparative baseline 
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essentially means that any “typical” hardship experienced by a child upon the loss of their 
parent will not be enough to prevent deportation. Finally, the hardship analysis contains 
no particular mechanism for hearing and considering the views of the child.  
 Best Interests (Article 3) Hardship 
Order of Analysis 1. Best interests of the child 
2. All other factors   
1. Situation of the applicant 
2. Hardship to child (or other 
qualifying relative(s))  
Weight of Child’s 
Interests 
Best interests is a primary 
consideration 
Hardship is a consideration 
Method of Analysis Pure (fact-specific 
assessment) 
Comparative (facts compared to 
“typical” case) 
Incorporation of 
Views of the Child 
Fundamental element of 
assessment  
Not necessary 
Table 2: Procedural Differences between Best Interests and Hardship Analysis  
Order of Analysis  
An Article 3 assessment involves a two-stage analysis: a consideration of the best 
interests of the child followed by a balancing of those interests against other relevant 
factors. The 2001 Australian Federal Court case, Wan v. Minister for Immigration and 
Cultural Affairs, first recognized the importance of separating the assessment into two 
stages. The court explained that the tribunal is required “to identify what the best interests 
of [the] children require […] and then to assess whether the strength of any other 
consideration, or the cumulative effect of other considerations, outweigh[s] the 
consideration of the best interests of the child understood as a primary consideration.”200 
The reason for this is simple: without first determining what is in the child’s best 
interests, a decision-maker cannot reasonably assess whether countervailing 
considerations outweigh those interests.201 It is “imperative” that a decision-maker 
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consider the initial best interests determination as a “distinct and separate stage” to the 
secondary balancing exercise.202 This first stage involves a consideration of all of the 
other rights in the Convention, as outlined in the following section. Only after the best 
interests have been assessed can the court take into consideration broader factors, 
including the situation of the parent(s).  
A hardship analysis under non-LPR cancellation takes place in the opposite order: 
the situation of the applicant is assessed (at least in part) before the hardship of their child 
is considered. Under INA § 240A(b), the applicant must first provide evidence of a ten-
year continuous period of residence, good moral character, and no convictions of certain 
listed crimes.203 Only if the applicant fulfils these requirements is hardship to their child 
considered. If an applicant does not meet the first three factors, the impact of deportation 
on the child is irrelevant. The cases in the Chapter 2 illustrate this issue: in both Oliva and 
Flores-Nova, the children were never granted an opportunity to illustrate hardship 
because their parents failed to meet the physical presence requirement.204 
Similarly, if an applicant has committed a certain crime, they will be statutorily 
barred from relief, and the interests of their children would never be considered. The 
crimes that bar an applicant from cancellation of removal include aggravated felonies, 
crimes of moral turpitude and falsification of documents.205 In the U.K. Supreme Court 
decision, ZH(Tanzania), the applicant had made two fraudulent asylum claims, crimes 
which on their own would likely have barred her from relief in the United States. 
However, in line with the requirements of a best interests assessment, the court first 
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considered the best interests of her children, before examining the crime. The court first 
determined that it was in the best interests of the children to remain in the United 
Kingdom with their mother, before weighing these against countervailing considerations, 
including their mother’s “appalling immigration history.”206 As a result of this balancing 
exercise, the applicant was granted relief from deportation. Not all cases end this way, 
but every case which complies with the CRC involves a consideration of the child’s best 
interests, regardless of any crimes their parent may have committed.  
Weight of Child’s Interests 
A further key procedural difference between the best interests and hardship 
assessments is the weight given to the interests of the child in the analysis. The balancing 
exercise conducted in the second stage of the best interests assessment illustrates the 
primacy that is given the best interests of the child. Under Article 3, the best interests of 
the child must be a primary consideration and must be given significant weight in the 
balancing process. Article 3 does not require that the best interests of the child be the 
primary consideration, or that they necessarily determine the outcome. But it does require 
that no other consideration be treated as “inherently more significant” than the best 
interests of the child.207  
In ZH(Tanzania), the U.K. Supreme Court determined the weight that should be 
given to the best interests of children who are affected by the decision to deport one or 
both of their parents. The court examined the circumstances under which it might be 
permissible to deport a non-citizen parent where the effect will be that their child will 
also have to leave.208 In its decision, the court drew upon caselaw from the European 
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Court of Human Rights (ECHR), recognizing that the Strasbourg court has become 
“more sensitive to the welfare of the children who are innocent victims of their parents’ 
choices.”209 The court acknowledged that the best interests may be outweighed by the 
cumulative effect of other considerations, but emphasized that, since no single factor can 
be treated as more important than best interests, a general concern about maintaining 
immigration control will on its own usually be insufficient to justify an outcome 
inconsistent with the best interests of the child.210 The court determined that the 
countervailing considerations were not strong enough to outweigh the best interests of the 
children, who “were not to be blamed” for their mother’s decisions.211  
Wider public interests, beyond the best interests of the child, can also weigh in the 
child’s favor in the Article 3 balancing process. Courts have held that there is an 
independent public interest in promoting the best interests of children. A U.K. Supreme 
Court decision involving the extradition of a parent held that “[i]t is not just a matter of 
balancing the private rights of children against the public interest in extradition, because 
there is also a wider public interest and benefit to society in promoting the best interests 
of its children.”212 The Canadian Supreme Court has also held that there is an 
independent public interest in the preservation and protection of the family unit.213 The 
primacy placed on the best interests of the child extends beyond even the particular child 
involved in the case.   
In contrast, children in the hardship analysis are treated in the same way as other 
qualifying relatives. The statute makes no distinction between children, spouses or 
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parents. In Matter of Monreal, the hardship that the respondents’ two U.S. citizen 
children would face is granted the same level of attention as the hardship that his two 
LPR parents would face. In its decision, the Board found that “the respondent’s children 
will suffer some hardship, and likely will have fewer opportunities, should they go to 
Mexico, and … that the respondent’s parents will suffer some hardship from having their 
son living father away” but found that the hardship did not rise to the necessary level.214 
The Board recognized that the children would accompany their father to Mexico, while 
the parents would remain in the United States, but failed to distinguish the former 
hardship as different to or greater than the latter.215 Furthermore, the Board failed to make 
any distinction between the impact of separation on a child as compared to the impact of 
separation on an adult – a failure that is a common theme in cancellation cases.   
Instead of emphasizing the importance of age of the relative, the cancellation 
statute emphasizes the immigration status of the relative: in order to qualify for a 
hardship assessment, the relative must be either a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 
resident. As such, a child who is neither a citizen or LPR will not qualify and any 
hardship to that child will be irrelevant in the cancellation of removal decision. In Matter 
of Recinas, the respondent had four U.S. citizen children and two “minor respondents,” 
aged 15 and 16. These two children were almost irrelevant to the decision – when they 
were mentioned, it was only to emphasize that their mother was the sole provider for “six 
children, four of whom are United States citizens.”216 The court is not required to analyze 
the hardship to any child who is not a citizen or LPR, making those children essentially 
invisible in the legal process.  
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Method of Analysis  
The third main procedural difference between the best interests and hardship 
assessments is the method of analysis. An Article 3 assessment entails a pure analysis of 
the situation of the child, applicant, and other factors relevant to the particular case. The 
nature of a best interests assessment is such that it examines the interests of the child in 
question solely, and does not compare these to any typical case involving a child facing 
parental deportation. The first stage of the analysis entails an examination of the child’s 
best interests in “isolation from other factors.”217 Even in the second, balancing, stage, 
the decision-maker must make a determination based purely on the “particular facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.”218  
In contrast, the hardship analysis is a comparative exercise. The hardship to the 
child is not balanced against countervailing considerations, but instead compared to a 
baseline level of hardship. According to Matter of Monreal, the applicant must 
demonstrate that the qualifying relative would suffer hardship “substantially beyond that 
which would ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.”219 The 
hardship analysis is essentially a hypothetical comparative exercise: the court must 
determine whether the hardship that would be suffered as a result of deportation is 
beyond a “typical” level of hardship. Because of this comparative baseline, hardship that 
is experienced by every child upon parental deportation will be insufficient to grant 
cancellation of removal. In Matter of Andazola, the Board found that “the fact pattern 
presented here is, in fact, a common one, and the hardships the respondent has outlined 
are simply not substantially different from those that would normally be expected upon 
                                                        
217 Kaur (children’s best interests / public interest interface) [2017] UKUT 00014 (IAC). 
218 ZH (Tanzania), quoting EB(Kosovo) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 41 [2009] AC 
1159. 
219 Matter of Monreal. 
  
50 
removal to a less developed country.”220 This comparative exercise is far from the pure 
assessment of best interests required under the CRC.  
Views of the Child  
The final procedural difference between the two forms of analysis is the 
importance granted to the views of the child. The consideration of the views of the child 
is a fundamental element of the best interests determination, one which sets Article 3 
apart from earlier conceptions of best interests.221 Article 12 sets forth the right to have 
the child’s views given “due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child.”222 In order to do this, the child must be “provided the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through 
a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules 
of national law.”223 
In the immigration context, courts have held that the interests of the child are 
unlikely to conflict with those of the family, so separate representation is usually not 
necessary.224 However, courts are careful to recognize that “while [children’s] interests 
may be the same as their parents’ this should not be taken for granted in every case.”225 
As such, decision-makers should be “alive to the point and prepared to ask the right 
questions.”226 In ZH(Tanzania), a letter from the children’s school and a report from a 
youth worker sufficed as representative of the children’s views. However, the court 
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emphasized that “immigration authorities must be prepared at least to consider hearing 
directly from a child who wishes to express a view and is old enough to do so.”227  
In contrast, under non-LPR cancellation, there is no statutory requirement, or 
interpretive guideline, which relates to considering the views of the child. U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) guidelines on determining extreme 
hardship make no mention of the incorporation of the views of the child.228 BIA caselaw 
makes some reference to the views of the child but fails to give their views due weight or 
consideration. In Matter of Monreal, the eldest child did testify in court regarding “his 
life in this country and his desire not to depart for Mexico.”229 However, this 
consideration is only weighed into the decision as evidence that the facts involved are de 
facto deportation rather than separation. 
The remaining two decisions grant even less weight to the views of the child. In 
Matter of Andazola, the eldest child testified to her “very close relationship with her 
grandmother,” but this was given no further consideration in the decision.230 In Matter of 
Recinas, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the four children (aged 12, 11, 8, and 
5) testified in court. INA § 240A(b) provides, at face value, a venue for testimony, but 
fails to give the views of the child due consideration. This failure to incorporate the views 
of the child sets the hardship analysis apart from the Article 3 assessment. 
IV. Substantive Differences  
 
The substantive considerations involved in the best interests and hardship 
assessments are also considerably different. The factors that are considered in each type 
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of analysis are overlapping to some degree: all factors considered in the hardship 
assessment are also considered in the best interests assessment, but not vice versa. Under 
the first stage of an Article 3 assessment, the decision-maker must consider three sets of 
factors: the views of the child; the specific situation and vulnerabilities of the child, 
including age, maturity and particular vulnerabilities; and the extensive catalogue of 
rights protected under the CRC.231  
In contrast to the specific set of rights that should be considered under an Article 
3 analysis, a hardship analysis can – but is not compelled to – consider a range of 
indeterminate factors. In Matter of Monreal, the Board determined that the same hardship 
factors considered under the previous “extreme hardship” standard should be considered, 
but that they must be “weighed according to the higher standard required for cancellation 
of removal.”232 These factors, listed under the USCIS guidance on extreme hardship, are 
much more broadly defined than the rights listed in the Convention. Decision-makers can 
consider family ties and impact, social and cultural impact, economic impact, and country 
conditions.233 Each one of these categories is encompassed by several rights in the 
Convention. More important, however, are the rights in the CRC that are absent from the 
hardship analysis. 
The rights enshrined in the CRC, which must be considered in every best interests 
assessment, span a wide range of social, economic, health, civil, political and cultural 
factors. Some of the most fundamental rights in the immigration context, aside from 
Article 3, are the right to non-discrimination (Article 2), the right to a nationality 
(Articles 7 and 8), the right to life, survival and development (Article 6), and the right to 
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not be separated from family (Article 9). All of these rights are either completely absent 
from or given insufficient weight in the hardship analysis.   
The right to non-discrimination (Article 2) is one of the most important rights in 
the CRC. Article 2 states that parties must ensure the rights in the Convention to each 
child “irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status.”234 The principle of non-discrimination provides 
that all rights are applicable to “each child within [the State Parties’] jurisdiction without 
discrimination of any kind.”235 Therefore, discrimination based on immigration status is 
prohibited. The statutory requirement that hardship to a child is considered only if that 
child is a U.S. citizen or LPR is clearly in violation of this requirement, discriminating 
against noncitizen and non-LPR children.  
The right to non-discrimination does not mean that citizenship is irrelevant – 
indeed, courts have recognized that citizenship plays an important role in the balancing 
process. The CRC recognizes the right of every child to acquire a nationality (Article 7) 
and to preserve her identity, including nationality (Article 8). As such, courts have held 
that, although nationality is not a “trump card,” it should be of particular importance in 
the balancing exercise.236 However, Article 2 does require that a child should not be made 
invisible or irrelevant to the proceedings by virtue of lack of citizenship or lawful 
residence. Article 2, in combination with Article 7 and 8, provide that all children must 
have their best interests considered, and that their citizenship will either be neutral or act 
as a positive weight in favor of remaining in the country. 
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A third fundamental right in the CRC which is absent from non-LPR cancellation 
is the right to life, survival and development (Article 6). This right goes beyond physical 
survival and includes the development of the child “to the maximum extent possible.”237 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recognized that “decisions to repatriate” 
can “significantly impact a child’s life and development.”238 Furthermore, the health 
conditions in the country to which a child may be deported can significantly impact a 
child’s development. USCIS guidelines on hardship determination state that decision-
makers should consider health conditions and care.239 However, in practice, this will only 
make a difference if the child in question has a significant health issue which requires 
superior healthcare. In Matter of Andazola, two dissenting Board members stated that 
“under the interpretation announced today, it is more likely than not that no respondent 
from Mexico will qualify for cancellation unless the qualifying relative has severe 
medical problems.”240 Such an interpretation is clearly in violation of Article 6.  
Finally, the CRC includes the right of a child to not be separated from their 
family, a right that is not recognized in cancellation of removal. Article 9 sets forth the 
principle that a child should not be separated from their family “except when competent 
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and 
procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.”241 This 
kind of best interests assessment is the most strict type: best interests must be not simply 
a primary factor, but the “determining” factor for decisions that would leave to the 
separation of a child from their parents.242 Although USCIS guidance states that decision-
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makers should consider “family ties and impact,” there is no particular emphasis on 
family unity or the impact of separation.243 Furthermore, the fact that BIA decisions are 
not subject to judicial review suggests that, even if such a determination were made, the 
statute would remain in conflict with Article 9 of the CRC.  
V. Conclusion 
 
There are several key differences between the best interests and hardship 
assessment. Caselaw from the Canadian courts provides an initial rebuttal to arguments 
that the hardship standard is simply the “converse” of best interests. There are key 
procedural and substantive differences between the best interests and hardship analyses, 
which demonstrate that – contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s superficial interpretation of the 
best interest standard – the two standards are entirely different forms of assessment. As a 
result of these differences, the interpretation of the statute in its current form does not 
comply with the CRC and Article 3. Because of the ambiguity of the hardship standard, 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, the statute may be construed in a way that complies with the 
CRC. The concluding chapter outlines possibilities for re-interpretation of the statute in a 
way that is in line with the CRC.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
I. Summary 
 
This thesis argued that the United States is failing to fulfill its obligations under 
customary international law to consider the best interests of the child under non-LPR 
cancellation of removal. Through an analysis of theories of customary law, the first 
chapter demonstrated that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the “best 
interests” principle are customary international law. The United States’ commitment to 
international law, enshrined in the Paquete Habana, illustrates that the U.S. immigration 
law should accord with the Convention. Furthermore, there exists already some 
cancellation of removal caselaw to support the conclusion that the CRC has risen to the 
level of customary international law. 
The second chapter analyzed whether the non-LPR cancellation statute should be 
interpreted in accordance with customary international law. Through an analysis of 
scholarship and caselaw on statutory ambiguity, it argued that the hardship standard, 
section (D) of INA § 240A(b), is ambiguous. The BIA’s published decisions illustrate the 
ambiguity present in the language of the statute and in Congress’s intent. According to 
the Charming Betsy canon, this ambiguity means that the statute must be interpreted in a 
way that accords with customary international law. 
The final chapter tested whether the statute is already in accordance with the CRC 
and best interests principle. Drawing on international jurisprudence and a close 
examination of procedural and substantive considerations required in each type of 
analysis, it found that the best interests and hardship assessments are fundamentally 
different. It concluded that, because of these differences, the hardship statute is currently 
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in conflict with customary international law and should therefore be re-interpreted in a 
way that ensures it complies – as far as possible – with the “best interests” standard.  
II. Implications: How to Incorporate a Best Interests Analysis   
 
In order to comply with the Convention, the non-LPR cancellation statute should 
be re-interpreted in a way that minimizes, and preferably eliminates, the differences 
identified in Chapter 3. First and foremost, the assessment of hardship must be 
interpreted to incorporate a best interests assessment when the qualifying relative is under 
the age of 18, and in such cases should follow the precedent of international 
jurisprudence. Some of the procedural differences may require a broader legislative 
change since they relate to the entire statute and not simply the hardship requirement. 
However, the majority of the substantive requirements can be altered through re-
interpretation of the statute, which can be conducted through litigation. 
The procedural and substantive changes which would bring the hardship analysis 
in line with the CRC and Article 3 are as follows:  
1. Reverse the order of analysis: assess the best interests of the child before the 
situation of the parent. (This would require a change to INA § 240A(b) sections 
(A), (B), and (C), as well as (D) the hardship requirement, so may only be 
possible with a legislative change.)  
2. Treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. This means 
that, although other cumulative considerations may outweigh the best interests of 
the child, no other consideration can inherently be more important.  
3. Remove the comparative baseline. The best interests of the child and the 
particular facts of the particular case should be considered without comparison to 
a “typical” fact pattern.    
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4. Grant children the right to be heard. Invite children to express their views 
through testimony and require decision-makers to grant these views due 
consideration and weight.  
5. Incorporate a best interests assessment for every child, regardless of 
immigration status, in line with Article 2 of the CRC, the right to non-
discrimination.  
6. Place greater emphasis on the importance of nationality, and the right of a 
United States citizen child to remain in their country of citizenship, in line with 
Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC.  
7. Place greater emphasis on the right to life, survival and development for 
every child, in line with Article 6 of the CRC.  
8. Place greater emphasis on the right to family unity and the right of a child to 
not be separated from their family, in line with Article 9 of the CRC.  
These recommended changes could bring the hardship statute into compliance 
with the CRC and the best interests principle. However, they are ambitious changes 
which may not be practical in the short-term and may face significant barriers in court. A 
more moderate change would be to re-interpret the current standard so that it incorporates 
some level of best interests assessment for qualifying relatives who are under the age of 
18. This assessment would include a consideration of the child’s views and their rights 
under the Convention, including a consideration of the traumatic impacts that deportation 
has on a child, and their increased vulnerability due to age.  
If Congress’ intent was to narrow the category of applicants eligible for this type 
of relief, as the BIA has held, this more moderate interpretation would not necessarily 
have to stray from that intended outcome. The main difference in outcome would be that 
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applicants with children are more likely to gain relief, whereas applicants without 
children may be less likely to. The comparative exercise (whereby hardship must be 
beyond “typical” hardship) would compare the situation of children with that of adults: 
due to increased vulnerability, their hardship would generally be higher than that which 
an adult might ordinarily be expected to experience. In this framing, a parent facing 
deportation who has a child under the age of 18 could be at a much lower risk of 
deportation than a parent without a child.  
Although this outcome is far from ideal, it could act as a short-term solution that 
brings the non-LPR cancellation of removal statute closer to the CRC and the “best 
interests” principle. There are elements of the Article 3 assessment, particularly 
procedural considerations, which may be challenging to incorporate into the hardship 
standard without a complete change in the statute, such as the order of analysis. This 
moderate re-interpretation could act as a short-term solution with the long-term goal of 
adhering to the recommended long-term changes listed above. This long-term goal must 
begin with small steps: the recognition that the hardship statute is not in compliance with 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and that it must undergo some kind of change 
in order to incorporate a best interests assessment for all children who face parental 
deportation.   
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